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Abstract 
As automobiles become more complex, the Big Three auto 
makers are turning to suppliers for the engineering and 
manufacturing of components. Bu_t rather then just supplying 
parts, suppliers will soon be asked to design and 
manufacture whole modular assemblies, such as wired and 
painted doors, which are ready for final assembly. 
In the past, modular assembly has failed. It has caused both 
suppliers and car companies to go out of business. ·single 
source suppliers have in. the past evolved into fat and 
inefficient manufacturers. At the ~ame time, modular design 
pushes much of the value-added work (profit) out of the 
assembly plant and into the shop where the modular -~-
construction I 1S taking place. Despite this, the 
re,lationships of the past are being entered into once again, 
with the hope that new agreements giving both-... suppliers and 
automakers more ownership of the risks and rewards will 
prevent history from repeating· itself. 
In the past few years suppliers have provided the automakers 
with some brilliant innovations, such as air bags, anti-lock 
brakes, and ready to assemble plastic body panels. However, 
at the same time they have been developing specialized areas 
. ' 
1 
of expertise that the automakers depend on, yet would be 
hard pressed to duplicate. 
Thus, the automakers are again at the mercy of their 
suppliers. 
Complicating matters is the threat United States suppliers 
face from Japanese competition. As these suppliers suffer 
lost market share and smaller (or non-existent) profits, so 
too will the automakers suffer. 
The only hope for a sustained healthy United States 
automotive industry is for this trend of modular outsourcing 
to be reversed. The automakers must bring back in-house 
design, manufacturing, and development of technologies. 
/ Otherwise, the United States automobile industry will slowly 
- ' 
' . 
evolve into nothing more then a sales and marketing 
enterprise selling others' products. 
2. 
, 
" 
) 
I 
Introduction 
r 
There is a new type of relationship developing between the 
automakers and their suppliers. 
Vehicles are becoming much more complex. They 
sophisticated electronic systems which effect the 
manner automobiles are designed and assembled. They are made 
of new materials, and are assembled • using processes 
developed to take advantage of these materials. 
These new complexities and technologies have lead to a new 
type of relationship between the automakers and their 
suppliers. Suppliers are 
./ 
becoming system integrators, 
bringing together different technologies to provide packaged 
- '·- ,,, . . . --,,, 
solutions. Where in the past a-supplier might manufacture 
just a door panel, today that same supplier may be expected 
to supply a completed door assembly with electrical and 
mechanical subassemblies already installed. The door would 
be painted and trimmed, and have an electrical plug that 
mates with the primary wiring harness. This trend has forced 
suppliers to move into technologies beyond their former 
3 
..... 
" 
-\"--
areas of expertise, taking over many of the tasks previously 
perf armed by the automakers. It is becoming common for 
suppliers to be given a functional specification of a part, 
from which they will design the actual component 1 • 
The automakers have found that in order to win the trust of 
their suppliers, and to get the suppliers to develop 
expensive research and development capabilities, they have 
had to make a long term commitment to them. This has led to 
the frequent single sourcing of components from suppliers. 
As the assembly plants move towards JIT (Just In Time) 
deliveries, the number of suppliers are being reduced. In 
order to win new contracts, suppliers · must provide 6 a 
quality product at the right time. The suppliers that evolve 
to JIT must change radically the way they schedule, ship, 
and package their products. 
Suppliers are starting to provide assemblies that are 
integrated packages ready for the assembly line. These 
modular build packages frequently require technologies or 
components outside the supplier's area of expertise. 
Suppliers are buying these components from outside sources 
and assembling them into their products. This has had the 
effect of off-loading some of the assembly work from the 
assembly plants to the component suppliers, and has given 
4 I 
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these first tier suppliers the choice of lower tier 
suppliers from which to-source these sub-subassemblies 2 • 
"\ 
General Motors Corporation's APV • • m1n1van, built • 1n 
Tarrytown, New York, is examined as one of the examples of 
the new supplier-automaker relationship. 
Because of General Motor's wish to get this new product to 
market very quickly, along with a lack of experience with 
the APV's many new technologies, GM choose to use outside 
suppliers for most of the research and engineering work. 
r 
The APV contains more polymers then any production vehicle 
ever before. Instead of developing this new plastics 
technology themselves in-house, General Motors relied on 
suppliers to do this development work for them. 
I 
outside suppliers provided the project with very high levels 
of materials, tools, and services. Not since the earliest 
days of automobile production has an automaker relied· so 
heavily on suppliers. 
' 
This supplier relationship puts the Tarrytown plant at great 
risk that one supplier's shortages could shut down the 
plant. The quality goals set for the APV have made the 
\ 
5 
.J 
) 
.. 
/,) 
/ . 
production startup very difficult 3 • 
Five suppliers to the GM Tarrytown plant are examined in 
detail, showing the large degree of early supplier 
involvement, supplier design and capitol investment, Just-
In-Time parts sequencing, and emphasis on quality. 
There are .. ltfany changes that must take place in order to 
manage these changing business relationships. As automotive 
manufacturers become more dependent on their suppliers, the 
managing of these suppliers is becoming increasingly 
• 
critical . 
.... 
In the past engineers usually chose suppliers based on 
technical decisions. These engineers were more interested 
in the functionality of components rather then the their 
overall cost. Many times, purchasing responsibilities were 
left to buyers who did not have a sufficient technical 
understanding of what they were buying, and who counted on 
their suppliers to provide the most technically appropriate 
components 4 • .. 
The automakers have begun to have experts from • various 
\ 
.. 
departments and functions work together as a group to choose 
suppliers. These people are chosen to select suppliers 
because they know what to look for • I~ 
6 
• 
,.. -... 
Because suppliers are now investing heavily in research and 
development for products they may not get to actually 
manufacture, suppliers are beginning to sell their design 
services on a contract basis before work is begun. Many 
times, automakers will buy a design and then have a 
different supplier manufacture the part. 
Outsourcing gives the tier-one suppliers more freedom in 
choosing sub-suppliers. This means that suppliers are now 
taking on the role that was formally performed by the 
automakers' purchasing departments. Suppliers must also 
assume responsibility for most of the engineering tasks that 
were once done by the automakers. 
One major reason that the automakers are so willing to 
transfer the design and development responsibilities to 
suppliers is the current corporate focus on short term 
earnings. Many times, work is outsourced to minimize long 
term investments in research and development. The heavy 
reliance on suppliers seems very attractive to automakers 
when viewed in the short term. However, over a longer period 
of time it is shown that this relationship can make the 
automakers too reliant on their suppliers, and that they 
will therefore become vulnerable to their suppliers' 
problems. 
7 
• 
• 
American automakers are relying more heavily on their 
suppliers for new technology. As the automakers shrink their, 
in-house research and development groups, and fail to 
develop in-house experts on new technologies, suppliers will 
be expected to provide more innovation and develop 
technologies themselves. 
American suppliers, and therefore the entire I American 
automobile industry, are being damaged by Japanese 
transplants and their suppliers. High value added suppliers 
for these transplants are mostly Japanese 5 • 
As the Big Three market share drops, the American supplier 
base is also losing market share. The automakers are running 
the risk of having access to only second generation 
technology by becoming fully dependent on its shrinking 
American supplier base 6 • 
This increased reliance on suppliers puts the automakers in 
a very dangerous position. By depending on suppliers, they 
lose control of their own products. They lose valuable 
value-added manufacturing, and are at the mercy of suppliers 
whose own technologies they depend on. 
8 
I.' 
In order to assure their own survival, the automakers must 
bring back in-house the modular components that they have 
outsourced. 
9 
. . 
• Chpt 1: The Changing Role of Automotive suppliers 
component complexity increasing 
New cars today are much more complex than they were just a 
few years ago. Cars today have very sophisticated electronic 
systems which control the vehicle and its many 'systems'. 
These electronics have greatly complicated the way 
automobiles are designed and assembled. They are made of new 
materials that have been especially engineered for 
automobiles, and are assembled using new processes developed 
to take full advantage of the special properties of these 
materials. 
It is obvious that electronics are playing a rapidly 
expanding role in automotive design, manufacture, and~ 
operation. In addition to the sophisticated CAD/CAM 
equipment used to design and manufacture a vehicle, 
automotive suppliers and manufacturers must contend with the 
demand for computer-based service diagnostic centers, 
improved environmental controls, safety, and performance. 
All of these factors have mandated a myriad of in-vehicle 
electronics. Some experts predict that electronics will 
account for 15 percent of the cost of the automobile by the 
10 
' ' 
mid-1990 's and 20 percent by the year 2000. One of the high-
cost items in building and servicing vehicles is the 
electrical wiring. Wiring of varying length and diameter 
form the interconnection link between each 
electrical/electronic component in the vehicle. Virtually 
. 
the entire electrical wiring for a car is made up in the 
form of a complex, expensive cable assembly called a 
harness. Building and installing the harness requires manual 
assembly ··· and • 1S time • consuming. The increased use of 
electrical and electronic devices has significantly 
increased the number of wires in the harness. Even today, 
the average American luxury car has over _ 5, ooo feet of 
copper wire to connect existing electronic and electric 
devices 7 • 
Today's extremely complex wiring harnesses also typically 
contain several microprocessors and interlinked "systems''. 
Examples of these systems are anti-lock brakes and traction 
control. These complex harnesses are custom built for the 
larger luxury cars. The makeup of a harness is determined 
\ by what electrical options are specified. This requires much 
early planning between suppliers and harness manufacturers 
to make sure that a car's wiring can accommodate all 
necessary electrical components. This custom wiring harness 
creates a real logistical problem at the assembly plants. 
11 J 
0 When coiled for assembly, all harnesses look the same. The 
solution has been for suppliers to sequence their harnesses 
so that they arrive at the assembly plant in the proper 
sequence according to the factory's build plan 8 • 
Components becoming systems 
The nature of electronics is changing from independent 
subsystems to interrelated control systems. An important 
~-
difference between future electronic systems and present 
electronic systems, even those performing a similar 
function, is the supplier integrated systems approach that 
will be used by vehicle manufacturers. 
" 
' 
) 
The car of the future will have a number of multifunctional 
microprocessors, all linked together to share information. 
To accommodate these microprocessors, General Motors has 
allocated the area under the deck, behind the back seat, as 
the location for all control modules 9 • 
Examples of Conventional Vehicle Systems: 
o Fan Control 
o Lamp Controls 
o Power Windows 
o Power Door Locks 
-
Examples of Supplier Integrated Systems: ! ., 
o Fuel Injection 
o Anti-lock Brakes 
o Electronic Transmission Control 
12 
·' 
I 
' 
o Ride Control 
0 
) 
Some of these systems, such as cruise control and wheel slip 
control, have evolved from being purely mechanical and 
independently functioning options to highly integrated, 
electronically controlled systems. Others, such as Anti-Lock 
Brakes, Self-Diagnostics, and Automotive Navigation systems, 
are made possible for the first time by new advances in 
automotive electronics, and are still not available on most 
cars. 
Each of these "systems" integrates features and functions 
• via electronic feedback and control. They • require the 
designer, manufacturer, and supplier to understand and plan 
for the interactions of seemingly separate items, for 
example cruise control and the limited-slip drive axle. Both 
cruise control and the limited slip drive axle control 
function in part by controlling the engine speed. They do 
" 
this by sharing common sensors and actuators. In the future, 
both of these tasks will be performed by a single, 
multifunction microprocessor. But today, slip control is a 
system typically designed and built us.:Lng more than one 
independent supplier, each one requiring coordination to 
properly manage the development of the system as a whole. 
13 
\ 
\_ 
I 
\ 
suppliers designing systems 
The future of automotive electronic development is evolving 
towards a totally integrated vehicle electrical 
(.'•' 
and 
electronic system. Suppliers will escape from the mechanical 
function replacement and "add-on" approaches of the past. 
They will seek to optimize the performance of the total 
vehicle through electronics. The total system will have 
great flexibility and adaptability, with extensive software 
control of multi-function features. This will offer 
customers new opportunities to customize their vehicle. 
Vehicle characteristics such as ride quality, ha11dling, 
r· l 
steering effort feedback, brake feel, information display 
format, and engine power versus economy tradeoffs will be 
controlled by the driver. 
, 
Operating as an information based system, the automobile's 
on-board electronics will use extensive computing capacity, 
multiplexed circuit technology, and extremely large amounts 
of program memory. 
Examples of these features include multi-purpose touch 
screen displays and speed control integrated with engine 
control. These examples represent only the leading edge in 
14 
integration of functions. This change will completely alter 
the future role of electronics suppliers. 
The first generation of new supplier designed and 
manufactured electrical-electronic systems such as anti-lock 
braking systems and multiplex wiring are present mostly in 
luxury vehicles. Other systems, still in the concept or 
iearly development stage, will require electronic components. 
beyond the level used in present vehicles. In order for 
these systems to be implemented in lower cost production 
vehicles, cost reductions will be required. New electronics 
technology which integrates both control and power promises 
to play a substantial role in cost reduction and is the key 
to making the transition from concept to volume production 
for future electronic systems. In addition, these power 
devices will provide space and weight savings, • <"l increased 
reliability, as well as offer diagnostic capability. Other 
areas of electronics will also require improvement, such as 
increased microprocessor speed, increased memory, advanced 
sensing, and improved packaging techniques. The combination 
of new power technologies and these other electronic 
advances will enable automotive electrbnics suppliers to 
design future electronic systems 10 • 
New engineered materials and adhesives are replacing stamped 
15 
It •• 
,, 
' 
metal and welding. Suppliers are now able to manufacture 
whole body panels that. are pre-painted and ready for 
assembly. These panels can then be glued onto the automobile 
frame, instead of being welded 10 • 
Th~s new level of complexity and advanced technology has 
lead to a new type of relationship between the automakers 
and their suppliers. Suppliers are becoming system 
integratorff, bringing together different technologies to 
provide packaged solutions. Where in the past a supplier 
might manufacture just a door panel, today that same 
supplier may be expected to supply a completed door assembly 
with electrical and mechanical subassemblies already 
installed. The door would be painted and trimmed, and have 
an electrical plug that mates with the primary wiring 
harness. This trend has forced suppliers to move into 
; 
technologies beyond their former area of expertise. These 
suppliers are developing their own research and development 
groups, and are becoming true design partners with their 
customers. It is also becoming common for suppliers to be 
given nothing Jnore than a functional specification of a 
part, from which they will design the actual component 1 • 
16 
,,.. .. , 
' 
Parts outsourcing 
The relationship betw~en suppliers and automakers has come 
almost full circle since the first days of the mass produced 
car. The early automakers were essentially designers, 
assemblers, and marketers of cars. Having perfected their 
prototype, they would farm out the manufacture of its parts. 
As volumes increased, and the automakers were better able 
to manage the 'buy or build' decision • using the new 
techniques of cost accounting, automakers brought back in-
house those manufacturing tasks that they could perform at 
a profit. 
Automakers became more vertically integrated, manufacturing 
as many components as possible. 
Perhaps the best example of this vertical integration was 
Ford's River Rouge plant. River Rouge, a two thousand acre 
facility, became one of the most highly vertically 
integrated automobile factories of all time with a 
manufacturing operation so complete it was virtually self-
sufficient. It had a deepwater port, a thirty thousand-
kilowatt power plant, the world's largest foundry, machines 
to machine all castings produced, and even purchased the 
Detroit, Toledo and Ironton Railroad, which meant that it 
could supply itself with adequate suppl.ies of . coal, ird'n 
17 
• 
ore, and wood by both water and rail. Ford had its own navy 
of ships to move raw materials from its own forests and 
mines to River Rouge 11 • Ford even had its own rubber 
plantations in the Amazon jungle 12 • Ford created what has 
been called an '' industrial colossus". 
However, despite this almost total vertical integration, 
Ford's engineering department (not purchasing) kept very 
close track of the cost of components available from outside 
suppliers. In the process, despite the e I increasing 
integration of the Rouge, Ford's engineers came to the 
unpleasant realization that 
outside" could be profitable 13 • 
I in many instances "going 
An earlier example of this was the changing relationship 
between Henry Ford and the Dodge Brothers. Dodge provided 
Ford with engines, transmissions, and chassis for the first 
Model A cars. Around 1905, Ford brought the engine and 
chassis back in house to save money. Over time, however, 
much of the work was again farmed out. For many years the 
Briggs Body company supplied car bodies to Ford. What is 
significant about this relationship, as well as later 
outsourcing at the Rouge, is that while Ford alternated 
between outsourcing and in-house manufacturing, they always 
had total co;ntrol of design 14 • 
,, 
18 
,, 
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I 
' Up until the early 1950's Briggs Manufacturing was a major 
supplier of bodies, doors, deck lids, and hoods to both Ford 
and Chrysler. Briggs not only made the stampings for these 
parts, they also did the design. Chrysler became very much 
locked into~Briggs and for all practical purposes Briggs 
became a single source supplier. There was no competition, 
consequently there was no incentive to control costs and all 
increases were merely passed on to Chrysler. 
-
The relationship between Briggs Manufacturing and Chrysler 
developed such· that Chrysler found itself a prisoner to 
Briggs pricing decisions, and Chrysler was unable to control 
costs. 
In 1954, Chrysler found it had no choice but to purchase 
Briggs in order to get its costs ,under control. The physical /~._-
assets of the purchase included three plants, all of which 
were antiquated because Briggs had no incentive to keep them 
efficient. Today none of these facilities exist 13 • 
After Briggs was purchased by Chrysler, Ford shifted its 
major body panel work to the Budd Company of Philadelphia. 
Budd at one time built all the truck bodies for Ford. Ford 
would have liked to have bought Budd, but Budd was too big 
19 
• 
and diversified at the time. Budd was eventually purchased 
by a German company, but not before Ford had already been 
forced to pull all of its truck body operations in-house 17 • 
The same type of relationship existed between General Motors 
and Fisher Body. Fisher Body was purchased by General Motors 
in the 1920's, and operated as a wholely owned subsidiary. 
The motto for years was cars by GM, body by Fisher 14 • 
A more recent example of single source problems occurred 
with TRW's subsidiary that provides the firing mechanism to 
inflate airbags. This vendor is the sole American producer 
of propellent packs to inflate airbags, and is a second tier 
supplier to other • companies such as Bendix. The 
manufacturing process to produce this propellent is very 
hazardous, and through poor safety practices this supplier 
suffered two fatal explosions that devastated the 
manufacturing plant. T~caused a severe shortage of 
propellent packs, which forced Chrysler, which had been 
putting air bags in all its cars, to quickly retool for and 
purchase conventional seat belts 15 • 
I 
Ford was alsoraffected, and has postponed indefinitely the 
installation of passenger side air bags on its Lincolns 16 • 
20 
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Today, 5, 000 or 6, 000 of the approximately 13, 000 pa~ts that 
' 
go into every car produced by Detroit's Big Three carmakers, 
Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors, are produced by 
independent outside manufacturers 14 • Shorter lead times, 
.. 
increasingly complex component systems, and the high costs 
of internal research and development, have made it no longer 
practical, or even possible, for automobile manufacturers 
to design and manufacture all the individual components and 
systems that make up an automobile. 
Shrinking product development times and increasingly complex 
technology are forcing automakers to ask suppliers to do 
more design and engineering than ever before. 
When deciding which manufacturing and design projects should 
be sent outside to vendors, the automakers are trying to 
keep high volume components in-house when ever possi~le. 
' 
. 
. These are the c9lJlponents where the traditional ecenomy of 
scale yields the mo~t profit, and where they can most easily 
recover their research and development investments. 
Low-volume components, or components that are made by 
suppliers that are recognized as experts in their field, are 
perfect candidates for outsourcing. Examples of successful 
outsourcing using supplier expertise are the Navistar and 
21 
• 
Cummings diesel engines that Ford and Dodge are using in 
their 1990 pickup trucks 17 • Neither Ford nor Dodge 
currently makes a small diesel engine of their own, and the 
capital costs of getting into this business are so great 
that neither automaker has any interest in doing/so. 
I 
Automakers will keep anything that determines the character 
of a vehicle in-house whenever possible. While the actual 
part may be engineered and manufactured outside, the 
I --\ 
automakers work-- hard to define the required "feel" for the 
stlJ?Plier. A good eXample of· this type of situation is the 
\ 
pedal feel on a brake system. The concept of how brakes work 
is straight forward. It is a simple force-versus-travel 
curve. But the right "feel'' for one car may be totally 
different than that for another. A luxury car like a 
Cadillac, for example, is expected to have different 
handling characteristics than a sporty car like a Corvette. 
Defining such intangible requirements is becoming more 
difficult as the systems that create these characteristics 
become more complex. ABS brakes and active suspensions are 
two examples of where this has already been a problem 23 • 
Single source suppliers 
The automakers have found that in order to win the trust of 
22 
( 
• 
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' 
their suppliers, and to get the suppliers to develop 
expensive research and development capabilities, they have 
had to make a long term commitment to them. GM has 
implemented a comprehensive vendor certification program 
where once a vendor is evaluated and certified, they are 
frequently awarded a single-source supplier contract. While 
• 
this has obvious benefits for the vendor, it also greatly 
reduces the administrative expenses of tracking multiple 
vendors, scheduling parts from different suppliers, etc. 
Single sourcing is the trend today, but it must be a very 
carefully managed relationship in order to be successful. 
Pitting supplier against supplier in order to achieve the 
lowest possible price is now considered short sighted 
thinking. However, the previous examples illustrate that 
without competition, or some equally effective means of 
motivation, suppliers have no incentive to keep their 
facilities modern and their prices competitive. 
• 
Parts suppliers as system integrators 
The complex electrical and mechanical systems in today's 
automobiles are the result of years of expensive research 
and development. Some of these systems were made possible 
through innovative materials and manufacturing processes 
which were developed by suppliers. Many of these 
( 23 
) 
~' 
• 
developments are the result of joint ventures between the 
automakers and suppliers, or between suppliers and second 
tier vendors of their own choice. 
The automakers have been increasing their percentage of 
outsourced materials, tools, and services for some time. 
Parts suppliers, both allied and non-allied, have been 
expected to take increasing responsibility for system 
integration, design, and research and development. This 
trend has yielded two results; that of shortening the time 
, 
it takes new models to go into production (lead time), and 
the short term reduction of design costs. This has been 
accomplished primarily by utilizing the smaller and more 
efficient expertise among supplier research and development 
groups. There is a growing trend to give potential suppliers 
only functional specifications for parts or services to be 
bid on. Thus, vendors are being asked to • engineer a 
.. solution, rather than simply supply a product or service 18 • 
Automobile manufacturers are relying more and more on 
suppliers to provide packaged systems that perform a 
specified function, instead of supplying "build to print'' 
products. The "build to print'' suppliers are becoming second 
or third tier suppliers. It is becoming more common for 
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first tier suppliers to do most or all of the design work. 
This design work has historically been an enormously 
expensive task when done in-house by the automaker. 
Suppliers are increasingly developing in-house research and 
i> 
development groups as weapons against competition from other 
I 
suppliers, each attempting to become "the expert" in a 
chosen niche. 
As Japanese transplants capture more and more of the 
American market share, parts suppliers are finding that 
research and development capabilities are essential for 
earning transplant business. Tetsuo Arakawa, executive VP 
of Nissan Motor Co., made the following comment I in 
Automotive Industries magazine on American parts suppliers: 
"The biggest problem we find with US parts manufacturers is 
\ 
. \__ 
,. 
their lack of research and development capabilities. ·At 
Nissan, we tend to want to involve parts suppliers at the 
initial stages in the design of a new car. We find that hard 
to do in the United States. If we ask 'can you have this 
part by next year,' we find very few say •yes' 19 II • 
Increased accountability for quality 
All the automakers have become very serious about shipping 
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quality products. An example of putting quality above all 
else is the way General Motors started up the Tarrytown 
plant for the production of the APV minivan. The start of 
_/ 
production was delayed months, and the line speed halved, 
• 
until assembly quality problems were fixed. The line still 
runs below its designed speed. The slowing of a new 
production line, by choice, is a very strong message from 
upper management. This same strong message about quality is 
being sent to General Motor's supplier network. 
Suppliers are being forced to increase quality, and the 
single source supplier base has helped. Assembly plants in 
the past have used large supplier bases as leverage to 
... 
negotiate short term contracts solely on cost. However, 
quality has been found to almost always increase as a result 
of a single-source vendor relationship, as the vendor is no 
longer forced to sacrifice quality to be just a little less 
expensive than the competition. It is not uncommon for 
contracts to be awarded to suppliers who are not the low 
cost bidders because they have proven to be the most 
competent supplier when measured by quality and schedule 
conformance. 
Suppliers are expected to increase their product quality 
continually, while at the same time reducing costs. 
26 
Suppliers are finding themselves closely scrutinized by the 
automakers, who,are demanding more input into how suppliers 
run their businesses. IBM is notorious for trying to manage 
their suppliers. This is the type of controlling 
relationship the automakers would like to have with their 
suppliers. 
Just-In-Time 
Automakers are well aware of the lower inventory carrying 
costs and improved quality that results from just-in-time 
delivery. JIT also benefits from single source suppliers, 
as the logistics of scheduling becomes simpler with fewer 
suppliers. There has been significant success in this area; 
General Motors of Canada currently sole sources~ 99 percent 
of its components 20 • Even though many of these components 
are simply sourced from General Motor's '·American allied 
supplier base, this is none the less an amazingly high 
' 
number. ( -·1 
As the assembly plants move towards JIT deliveries, the 
number of suppliers are being reduced to those who can 
provide both quality and timely delivery. The suppliers that 
evolve to JIT must change radically the way they schedule, 
ship, and package their products. 
r 
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Part sequencing 
- -
By requiring vendors to arrange arriving materials to match 
production schedules, as in the case of seats at Chrysler's 
Sterling Heights plant, inventory control and materials 
handling is greatly simplified. The seat manufacturer for 
GM Tarrytown has built a dedicated factory 15 miles north 
.,- ·"' 
. 
of the assembly plant, in Central Valley, New York, in order 
to supply sequenced seats on a JIT schedule. 
As mentioned previously, General Motors sequences wiring 
" 
harnesses on its production line, using barcodes for 
,, ' 
tracking. Because each harness is custom built for a 
particular opt-ion combination, sequencing is not a 
convenience, but rather a necessity. 
Modular build packages 
Suppliers are now expected to supply assemblies that are 
integrated packages ready for the assembly line. These 
packages, called modular build packages, frequently require 
technologies or components outside the supplier's area of 
\ 
expertise. Suppliers are buying these components from 
outside sources and assembling them into their products 21 • 
This has had the effect of off-loading some of the assembly 
work from the assembly plants to the component suppliers, 
and has given these first tier suppliers the choice of lower 
28 
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tier suppliers from which to source these sub-subassemblies. 
Frequently, lower tier suppliers are the first tier 
supplier's competitors in other areas 22 • 
This modular design concept greatly simplifies the assembly 
process as well. Doors, for example, will • arrive from 
vendors already painted and wired and ready to be assembled. 
Once the door is hung on the car, the connection of one plug 
marries it to the wiring harness. 
This trend towards supply of complete modular units for 
assembly is having a significant impact on the component 
manufacturing divisions of the major automakers, because 
what was once a captive market to parent companies is now 
open to global competition. 
For example, right now Packard Electric has contracts to 
supply body wiring to all American built General Motors 
vehicles except the NUMMI Toyota joint venture. If doors 
were to be outsourced, the supplier building the door would 
have the option of sourcing the door's wiring harness from 
whichever supplier he chose. This would make it possible for 
an American built door to have a Japanese wiring harness. 
Likewise, other allied General Motors divisions and long 
time non-allied suppliers \ that make 
29 
door trim, glass, 
t 
handles, etc, would find themselves facing tough new 
competition. These present first tier suppliers would then 
become second or third tiers. 
The 1991 Buick Pa'rk Avenue and Oldsmobile 98 will have a 
I , 
~crompletely modular headliner manufactured by United 
Technologies. Everything from the sunshades, assist straps 
and overhead consoles with electronics, switches, lamps, 
complete wiring harness , and other designed features are 
incorporated into a one-piece system. 
The headliner can be snapped onto the car at the assembly 
plant by two people, compared wi~h the 12 or more required 
to install a traditional headliner. This saves General 
Motors time, money, and manufacturing space. Right now, 
. 
Packard Electric supplies the complete wiring harness to 
United Technologies. In the future, -however, United , 
Technologies i~ free to purchase wiring from wherever it can 
get the highest quality at the lowest cost. 
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Chpt 2: suppliers As Designers and system Integrators 
Bendix airbags 
Many problems exist in the design and implementation of air 
bag systems. Some of them relate to sensor design, inflater 
design and air bag design and are independent of the 
particular car model on which they are used. Specific to the 
vehicle are the steering column performance, the knee 
bolster performance, car structural characteristics, and the 
placement and calibration of the sensor systems. The major 
problem facing most automotive manufacturers when 
implementing an air bag system is the performance of the 
,steering column. The steering column angle for many vehicles 
is too high to properly position an air bag. Many steering 
columns are too weak to withstand the loads and torques 
during a crash. 
The second most critical problem is the design and 
implementation of the knee bolster. Usually an equal amount 
of effort is spent on the knee bolster as on the air bag 
system itself. 'The task is complicated by the presence of 
structural members behind the knee bolster 23 • 
34 
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The structure of the vehicle also has a critical effect on 
the performance of the air bag system. 
When the 1990 Chevrolet Geo Metro Convertible, built by the 
Suzuki Motor Company, needed a complete driver air bag 
~ 
system, Bendix Safety Restraints Group was chosen to design, 
develop, and integrate the entire program in July 1988 24 • 
The Geo Metro Convertible, a unique vehicle, is one of the 
smallest passenger cars sold in the U.S. The smallness o-f 
the vehicle made the installation of the air bag a difficult 
task for Suzuki, who did not have any air bag expertise 
developed in-house. One of the biggest challenges for Suzuki 
was the lead time. Pilot production parts were due by the 
fall of 1989 - substantially less time than a project of 
... 
this size had previously taken 24 • 
Because of their lack of in-house expertise, along with the 
difficult time constraint, Suzuki contracted the project to 
Bendix. Bendix is one of the largest first tier suppliers 
and designers to the automotive industry. 
Building upon technology they had previously developed in 
their own research labs, Bendix defined an air bag system 
35 
for the vehicle and specified system components that were 
already designed and available. A variety of tests and 
studies were conducted to calibrate the system to the 
vehicle: computer math modeling, static and dynamic sled 
tests, full-scale vehicle crash tests, and rough-road and 
abuse testing. ·rn addition, extensive component tests were 
undertaken for computer input data and air bag component 
validation. 
Crash sensor modeling and testing determined the optimal 
locations to position the sensors on the automobile.·Sensor 
calibration levels were established to discriminate between 
crashes and non-crashes across the vehicle's entire 
operating temperature range and the sensor operating 
tolerance range. 
Vehicle, air bag system, and occupant simulation studies 
provided design information for performance under various 
test conditions and also for different size and out-of-
posi tion occupants. 
The driver air bag module and • sensing system were 
electrically integrated with a diagnostics module and a 
steering wheel contact coil, then packaged into the vehicle 
• 
with its own wiring harness. The wiring harness was designed 
36 
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to interface directly with the cars master wiring harness, 
and could be plugged together during assembly. 
Bendix was respo~sible for verification· of designs, 
validation of processes, and reliability studies, including 
failure mode and effects analyses (FMEA}. Suzuki, along with 
B~ndix, va1·idated the performance of the complete production 
air bag system in the Geo Metro. In support of Suzuki's 
assembly and service program, Bendix coordinated the design 
and development of test equipment and procedures. 
Bendix was able to complete the project in just 18 months . 
. 
This was accomplished by drawing on their past restraints 
system experience, and state-of-the-art technology from 
second-tier suppliers. Continuous and candid communication 
among all the involved parties - from manufacturer to first 
and second tier suppliers - helped smooth out problems and 
allowed orderly transitions from one phase of the project 
to th'e next 25 • 
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Bendix antilock brakes 
Another good example of a systems application of supplier 
designed and manufactured electronics is the antilock 
braking system (ABS). This system functions to prevent 
wheels from locking when the brakes are applied • in a 
relatively low wheel/road friction situation, such as on wet 
or icy roads. 
If the brakes are applied with sufficient force (panic 
braking) one or more of the wheels may "lock" ( cease 
rotating) and the tire skid over the road surface. In a 
severe skid, there is usually a loss of steering control 
over the vehicle. Severe loss of steering control in a panic 
braking situation can result in collision, and is clearly 
an undesirable condition. 
An ideal ABS system would measure wheel skid by measuring 
the difference between wheel speed and vehicle speed. 
However, no cost effecti\(,e sensor for vehicle speed has been 
developed that operates independently of wheel speed. 
On the other hand, a number of ABS systems have been 
developed by suppliers that are based upon measurements of 
wheel deceleration. Wheel speeds at two closely spaced 
instants are measured and subtracted. Whenever the earlier 
·39 
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wheel speed exceeds the later by a threshold value, a skid 
condition is detected. 
In a skid condition, the ABS system generates an electrical 
signal that lowers the brake pressure by an amount which is 
sufficient to eliminate brake lock. Suppliers have designed 
many systems that have been produced and sold. 
The first anti-lock braking systems functioned by 
controlling the braking forces on each wheel individually, 
known as Individual Control (IC). Early results showed that 
this provided maximum adhesion between the tire and road, 
and resulted in -the shortest possible braking distance 
without wheel lockup. 
Chrysler engineers had been working for years on designing 
an antilock braking system (ABS) for a light truck vehicle. 
They had a lot of difficulty perfecting a system that could 
operate in both 2 and 4 wheel drive. 
Because their loading tends to vary more widely than 
passenger cars, light trucks are especially ··good candid.ates 
for 4-wheel ABS, where improved steerability and stability 
are needed on slick road surfaces regardless of loads. 
In developing the antilock system for the 1989 Jeep Cherokee 
and Wagoneer models, Chrysler contracted with Bendix to 
supply a total integrated system. Bendix was chosen by 
Chrysler for two reasons: 
(1) Bendix already had extensive • experience • 1n 
developing 4-wheel passenger car ABS. 
( 2) Bendix had extensive experience with complete 
hydraulic brake actuation systems for light trucks, 
from master cylinders to vacuum power boosters. This 
gave Bendix a technical depth and knowledge of the 
intricacies and difficulties of ABS that Chrysler did 
not have, and could not develop cost-effectively. Even 
if Chrysler did develop the expertise in-house, it 
would have taken years to do so. 
A first step in designing the Bendix 4-wheel ABS was to 
develop a fast and powerful electronic logic to compute the 
individual speeds of all four wheels and command solenoid 
valves to react accordingly. This· resulted in an electronic 
control unit {ECU) based on a 16-bit microprocessor used to 
ronitor the brake system operation from data provided by 
wheel speed sensors and pressure switches. To assure proper 
operation, the ECU continuously checks the sensor presence, 
41 
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solenoid continuity, battery voltage, system and motor pump 
relay states, and hydraulic integrity. In addition, the unit 
monitors the microprocessor to determine if it is working 
properly. 
·-
Simultaneously Bendix needed to design a system that would 
permit 4-wheel drive antilock despite axle interaction. The 
answer was new software filtering plus sophisticated 
acceleration measurement. This combination gave a better 
indicator of overall vehicle speed and could be used 
effectively in all types of 4-wheel drive modes. 
The final phase in perfecting the Cherokee and Wagoneer ABS 
system was thousands of hours of laboratory and vehicle 
testing. 1.5 million miles were logged testing durability 
and reliability 26 • 
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APV minivan 
·The General Motors APV minivan vehicle was developed as a 
totally new design show vehicle in 1986. The vehicle was 
developed because General Motors was being criticized for 
its look·-alike styling. 
At the time, the Chrysler Corporation's minivan had created 
its own niche market, and was producing huge sales and 
profits. General Motors wanted to create a vehicle to 
capture some of Chrysler's minivan market share. 
,~-~ ) ) 
General Motors Chairman Roger Smith and GM's outside board 
of directors saw the APV as a very bold and important move 
to silence the growing criticism from inside and outside GM 
about look-alike styling, and announced the launching of the 
project with much publicity. 
General Motors felt that it was important to get the APV to 
market as soon as possible. Because the APV was given such 
strong support from within the corporation, the project was 
,,-
given special importance and was launched with a timetable 
that would be impossible using traditional design and 
production development procedures. 
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Although the vehicles are based on GM's A-body, front drive 
car platform, the body is so radically different, with its 
plastics, glues, and wide expanses of glass, that the APV 
was treated as a from the ground up project 27 • 
& 
Because of the time constraints and General Motor's lack of 
experience in these new technologies, GM was unable to 
develop and engineer the APV in the usual manner. 
A similar situation occurred when Roger Smith had his vision 
to manufacture the Saturn. In this instance, General Motors 
chose to create a whole new organization that hopefully will 
be able to shorten successfully the time it takes to 
engineer a totally new product. 
For the APV, General Motors chose to turn to outside 
suppliers for almost all of the research and engineering 
work. The APV minivan was the largest General Motors sub-
contracted production engineering project ever done outside 
General Motors 3 • The development and production of the 
minivan depended on suppliers for almost all of its new \._ 
advanced materials and assembly technologies. GM let their 
suppliers develop the most extensive use of plastics ever 
used on a production vehicle, instead of doing it themselves 
in house. This development work included the lat-gest 
44 
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vehicle 3 suppliers Adhesives body panels made ever • 
developed space-age glues to hold the plastic exterior 
panels to a metal "space-frame" cage 29 • 
The APV is on the leading edge of many supplier developed 
manufacturing trends. Perhaps the most significant trend in 
materials is the use of plastic body panels instead of sheet 
metal. These panels will be increasingly used because of 
their light weight, resistance to corrosion, ability to be 
pre-painted by suppliers, and their much tighter 
manufacturing tolerances. However, these panels require a 
totally new assembly process which is incompatible with 
sheet metal 28 • 
Because of environmental restrictions on fluorocarbon 
coolants, air conditioners will become less powerful and 
effective. This trend, combined with the trend of cars 
becoming more aerodynamically shaped with larger glass 
areas, has led to the development of space age glass that 
can be used in automobiles. This glass reflects infrared and 
ultraviolet radiation, while appearing less tinted· than 
today's auto glass 30 • 
,I New fastening techniques, some in conjunction with plastic 
panels, have been developed. These processes, both 
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mechanical and chemical, are more reliable, but more 
complex, than welding. Outside suppliers supplied the 
project with more materials, tools, and services better than 
for any other new car ever. 
Suppliers had to make a pledge of absolute commitment to 
complex JIT supply lines in order to be awarded contracts. 
This supplier relationship put the Tarrytown plant at great 
risk that one supplier's shortages could shut down the 
plant. The quality goals set for the APV have made the 
production startup painful and very slow by traditional Big 
Three standards 3 • 
Suppliers knew up front that t~e APV was · a high risk 
project, yet agreed to invest millions in new facilities in 
order to be chosen as suppliers. Bec~use of the compressed 
lead times, the suppliers suffered significantly from 
engineering changes, and these changes strained their 
relationship with General Motors 17 • 
The APV uses very high levels of new materials • 1n a 
revolutionary assembly process. A large team worked together 
to come up with the processes required to produce the APV. 
Many of the materials and processes used for the minivan 
were used for the first time ever. No one had ever built a 
46 . 
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high-volume, plastic vehicle over a space frame with such 
huge plastic panels. For General Motors it was a new 
experience working with other GM component divisiorts and 
outside suppliers under such tight time constraints. These/ 
time constraints proved especially painful when working with 
so many unproven technologies 28 • 
All major suppliers had full-time representatives inside the 
Tarrytown plant. This level of supplier involvement is rare 
in the automotive industry. 
Tarrytown's capacity at full speed was designed to be as 
high as 60 vans an hour on two shifts. However, General 
Motors management has said that the ability to meet 
stringent quality standards will dictate production rates, 
not customer demand. Because of this philosophy high volume 
orders were very slow to materialize, which hurt suppliers' 
cash flow, especially during the early stages of production.· 
General Motors has produced two other vehicles using plastic 
panels, the Fiero and the Corvette. The Fiero had a similar 
'space-frame' const~uction, but the body panels were milled. 
and bolted into place, instead of glued as in the APV. The 
APV's planned annual production is far more than the other 
plastic vehicles, about 225,000 an~ually. The Fiero's 
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biggest year was 125,000, and the Corvette is only 25,000 
17 per year • 
/ 
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If the APV technology proves successful over the next few 
years, many more cars being developed for the future will 
probably use the much llOre plastic and glass intensive 
•' 
'space frame' design. 
If this 'space frame' design -becomes the trend, the APV's 
plastics and adhesives suppliers will benefit from a huge 
gain in credibility. If adhesives become widely used, these 
suppliers will have the advantage of a significant head 
start on this new technology, and have the potential to earn 
huge profits from the new .. business. 
If the vehicle is a failure, either technically or by low 
sales, it will be a major setback for these suppliers. Many 
have invested so much money in this ·project that very low 
sales and no new adoption of this technology could cause 
them to go bankrupt. 
Despite the risks, major automotive suppliers have been 
forced to commit themselves to the minivan if they want to 
.• 
be part of the automotive industry trend of sourcing more 
business with fewer suppliers. These suppliers have spent 
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millions to build plants and products dedicated to just the 
APV. Five of the suppliers that· have made the largest 
investments are listed below: 
GenCorp Automotive has spent $65 million on a new high-tech 
plant in Shelbyville, Indiana, to produce the major sheet 
molding compound (SMC) panels for the APV's right side and 
the rear liftgate. · · 
GenCorp' s new plant is tot~lly dedicated to APV panel 
production. The plant employs 450 workers and incorporates 
the latest in sheet molding manufacturing and processing 
technology. 
Nineteen state of the art computerized compression molding 
presses. are used to mold parts. The parts are then placed 
on overhead conveyors and run through autoplant style paint 
booths for a coat of primer before being shipped to 
Tarrytown. This eliminates a painting step at the final 
assembly plant. In the future it is-planned to finish paint 
.. the panels at the supplier's plant. The parts would then 
arrive sequenced for the production line at Tarrytown, ready 
for assembly without painting 29 • 
) 
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Budd Corporation has built a $24 million plant • 1n 
Kendallville, IN, to produce the big SMC panels for the 
APV's left side. This plant employs around 500 people, and 
uses special computerized, fast-acting SMC presses, 
including one specially built for the APV that is the 
world's largest. 
Both GenCorp Automotive and Budd have gone to extraordinary 
lengths and expense to ensure top quality finishes and fits 
with their panels. General Motors insisted that both 
companies install computerized coordinate measuring machines 
for statistical quality control and dimensional analysis. 
The reason is that SMC parts cannot be bent and hammered 
like steel to accommodate sloppy fits on the assembly line. 
Dimensions must be perfect the first time 42 • 
PPG Industries Inc. was responsible for developing and 
manufacturing the APV's huge sloping wind~hield. The glass 
contains a solar control coating that PPG developed to 
reduce interior heat buildup inside the minivans . 
Standard tinted glass windshields tend to absorb infrared 
and ultraviolet light rays from the sun, significantly 
increasing interior temperatures. The APV's windshield is 
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so huge that standard tinted glass would make the interior 
unbearably hot during the summertime. 
PPG's solar contro~ windshield - f0und only on the APV, and 
sourced only from PPG - has a special layer of material 
sandwiched inside the windshield that reflects heat 
producing infrared and ultraviolet radiation, while allowing 
visible light to pass through unimpeded. 
This reflective quality makes the windshield relatively 
clear compared to t~d glass, allowing for better vision 
at night. 
PPG has invested several million dollars in the equipment 
to produce the windshield. 
The trend is for new vehicle designs to contain more glass 
surface area. This, combined with future environmental curbs 
on refrigerants that will make air conditioners slower and 
less efficient, will make temperature control more 
difficult. If the APV' s solar-controlled windshield performs 
well,· PPG will have a significant lead in any future heat 
absorbing auto glass market 30 • 
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.Dow Chemical Company, developed the polyurea used in the 
APV' s fenders. While there are other polyureas on the 
market, Dow's material, chemistry, and knowledge led to 
technical developments that have .made their product 
superior, and has led to Dow's being chosen as the only 
polyurea supplier for the APV. Dow's polyurea dimensional 
stability is better, and its overall physical properties 
make it easier to process than other polyureas on the 
market. Dow's improved polyurea allows for better surface 
quality on finished fenders than in -the past, and it 
processes far better than polyureas used on Fiero. General 
Motors was finally convinced to use Dow as their only 
supplier of polyurea because of Dow's willingness to work 
with GM to develop a new material that was able ·to be 
processed on the old Fiero equipment. The other suppliers 
offered materials that required new, faster, and more 
.expensive equipment. 
If the APV is a success Dow will realize a significant new 
volume of business. Dow's plastics are used in 35 interior 
applications for a total of 100 pounds of plastic per 
vehicle 42 • 
Ashland Chemical Company developed the adhesive being used 
--.... 
to fasten the major plastic panels to the APV's steel space 
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frame. While this technology has been used for 20 years on 
the Corvette, and more recently on the Fiero, and on truck 
front ends, the APV will be the first high volume vehicle 
to make extensive use of structural adhesives. Unlike the 
Fiero, many major panels will be fastened only with 
adhesives, with no back-up bolts. 
d 
Ashland, the sole structural adhesive supplier for the APV, 
has been developing the APV adhesives with General Motors 
• t • • for four years. It designed and supervised the manufacturing 
of the adhesive dispensing equipment, and worked on 
prototypes with Pininfarina during early development stages 
of the APV. 
The result is Ashland's Pliogrip, a family of polyurethane 
adhesives that have made possible a much faster, higher-
production line than that of the Fiero or torvette. The glue 
was engineered to have a high resistance to sag, which 
allows it to be applied by robots without dripping. In order 
to accommodate JIT delivery, the adhesives were engineered 
to flow by gravity, so that.,they could be pumped throughout 
the assembly plant easily before application, even though 
once applied they set up faster then th~ older polyurethane 
adhesives. This makes it possible for the adhesive to be 
delivered in 300 gallon bulk returnable shipping containers, 
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simplifying materials handling 28 • This also solves the 
expensive problem of disposing of em~ty glue drums, which 
are considered hazardous waste because of residual glue 
still inside. 
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Chpt 3: Managing the Automotive supplier Relationship 
The new need to manage suppliers 
As automotive manufacturers become more dependent on their 
suppliers, the managing of these suppliers is becoming 
" increasingly critical. Strategic manufacturing is becoming 
. a partnership between the big corporations that supervise 
the design, assembly; and marketing of finished products> 
and fewer, smaller, smarter suppliers - often single source 
suppliers. Getting this partnership going, and.keeping it 
/ 
.,,-....._;.,""' 
competitive, is no easy task. It may be the single most 
important task of the people who run the manufacturing 
organization. 
One of the most significant· differences between traditional 
supplier management and future-focused single source 
supplier man~gement is the realization that the cheapest 
component is,. in. the long term, not necessarily _the least 
expensive. Once the cost of poor quality is factored in~ 
downtime, rework, scrap, warranty work, etc. the cheapest 
may in fact be the most expensive. Because poor quality is 
so expensive, purchasing agents and engineers·have to be 
:' 
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much more careful in selecting suppliers, and they must 
( 
learn more about suppliers technical, research, and 
development capabilities than ever before. They need to 
research carefully suppliers, and work to develop mutually 
beneficial relationships once a supplier is chosen 31 • 
Historically, purchasing agents have recommended the award 
of two or more contracts for the supply of critical 
material. This assured that the automakers were not captive 
to any one supplier, and that the suppliers would keep their 
prices low based won the fear of losing contracts to the 
competition. The auto industry was notorious for driving 
hard bargains aimed at getting the lowest possible price 
from its suppliers. American car manufacturers tolerated a 
1 % to 3 % defect rate in incoming purchased materials, or 
10,000 to 30,000 defects per million 32 • 
Today, the automakers have shifted their focus from the 
lowest price to the lowest "total'' cost. They have carefully 
researched the capabilities of potential suppliers. They 
have assisted suppliers with statistical quality control and 
CAD/CAM training. The automakers have motivated their 
.... 
suppliers by offering them long term single source 
. contra.cts, · and h ve seen reduced prices by helping suppliers 
to improve their efficiency. 
:r 
,, 
\ ( 
\., 
56 
d 
•. ' 
·• 
• I 
• 
., 
' 
"' 
Selection of suppliers 
_) 
. In the past, the selection of suppliers was usually the 
responsibility of engineers who were not very concerned with 
the financial implications of their deci~ions. They tended 
. ~---
to look for products and technologies that advanced the 
state of the art of the product they were designing. They 
looked for improved performance features of the products, 
• 
and for suppliers who had excellent engineering capabilities 
but may have been weak in manufacturing or quality, or 
lacking in financial resources. Even more often, purchasing 
I 
responsibilities were left to buyers who lacked sufficient 
technical understanding and counted on the market forces of 
competition to produce suppliers with technological depth 
33 
• 
The selection of a critical supplier should be a team 
effort. Big companies need to have experts from various 
departments and functions recruiting suppliers. The people 
choosing these suppliers should be people who know what to 
look for. 
When selecting a new supplier, progressive companies develop 
a team made up of people from purchasing, design 
engineering, quality, manufacturing, product planning, 
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finance, and related functions. The team should review the 
potential supplier's capabilities carefully in research and 
development, production, and quality management 34 • 
At Ford, product development teams invite two or three 
qualified suppliers to compete on the design of new parts. 
Ford analyzes these suppliers' designs, quality plans, and 
price proposals. Then purchasing, with assistance from other 
team members, conducts a cost analysis, and proceeds with 
negotiations. The successful proposal must satisfy a balance 
of objectives: function, quality, aesthetics, price. The 
successful supplier normally becomes the only source of 
supply for the life of the product 35 • 
General Motor's evaluation procedure begins with a supplier 
filling out a self-assessment form that asks about operating 
philosophies, business systems, research and development, 
and overhead costs, among other things. Then a team of three 
or four GM people visit the supplier's facilities for three 
or four days, focusing on five critical areas: 
(1) organizational effectiveness and.commitment 
(2) planning systems and documentation 
(3) cost awareness, monitoring, and reduction 
(4) scheduling and delivery compliance 
(5) technology capabilities and research and 
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Developing suppliers as designers 
-Automakers have been· working to .develop further the 
manufacturing and t_e.chnological capabilities of outside 
suppliers. When they fail to do so, problems with quality, 
cost, and technical evolution can result. Suppliers must be 
active from the beginning in product design, when they can 
have a major impact on design and cost. The best managed 
suppliers will create product designs from functional 
descriptions, and provide th~ir customers with new products. 
and solutions by anticipating future needs. 
To involve suppliers effectively, and early, manufacturing 
companies should invite suppliers' engineers into their own 
engineering departments. Packard Electric, a major supplier 
to the auto industry, places its engineers, called CIE's 
(cooperative involvement engineers) in each of its customers 
plants. These engineers review the design of the entire 
wiring subassembly before committing to it. This helps 
Packard to understand the true needs of the customer, and 
anticipate the customer's future needs. 
The growing trend among the automakers is to develop an 
''envelope'' of performance specifications for suppliers to 
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bid on. This forces the designer to do at least some 
. 
preliminary design work before bidding. This is attractive 
to the automakers because they can look to their potential 
suppliers for th~·most innovative designs, and do not have 
to invest their own resources to design many parts. 
) 
To improve their • services constantly and 
j 
attract new 
customers, many suppliers have built world-class Technical 
Centers in the Detroit area as well as in locations around 
the United States. In the April 1990 issue of Automotive 
Industries magazine, the annual automotive suppliers issue, 
there were no less than 35 automotive suppliers with either 
one full page or two full page advertisements describing 
-their technical research and development facilities. These 
suppliers have applied "quality tools'' such as Statistical 
.PFocess Control,. Taguchi Methods and knowledge based 
reasoning to their operations 
; 
aggressively. They are 
spending time and money on data compatibility, training, and 
vendor certification programs 37 • 
Asking suppliers to invest so heavily in research and design 
has created a new type of business arrangement betwee}'.1 
. suppliers and·autornakers. It is not uncommon for suppliers 
,:..,, 
.. ~ •' . 
to sell their design services outright, or to have the 
automaker buy a design but choose a lower-tier supplier to 
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manufacture the part, as illustrated in the following 
example. 
Simpson Industries, Inc. is typical of this new 
relationship. It has a research and development budget of 
$1 million and a laboratory staff of 15. It has • S1X 
engineers co-located in its largest customers' engineering 
departments, where they provide design help from the very 
start of a project. 
Simpson has a variety_ of design contracts with its 
• customers. It.: has recently entered into a nine year 
agreement with Consolidated Diesel that required Simpson to 
invest$ 9 million for a new plant in North Carolina. This 
is an open ended agreement. Under the terms of the contract, 
Consolidated reviews Simpson's costs annually. From this 
relationship Simpson has gained $145 million • 1n new 
. . 
business, and an anticipated extension of the agreement. At 
the same time, Consolidated is free to choose another 
manufacturer if Simpson does not maintain a high level of 
", 
quality, cost control,, and schedule conformance 38 • 
Simpson al~o developed the balance shaft for the General 
Motors BOC· (Buick, Olds, Cadillac) division's 3800 series 
engine. BOC called for bids and Simpson, along with other 
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suppliers, developed and built a prototype to be tested py 
BOC. BOC structured its bids in a way that allowed it to 
reserve important benefits. In effect, it called for design 
ideas, leaving itself some flexibility in produc\ion 
negotiations. Under its contract with Simpson, if Simpson's 
design is chosen, BOC may still select another supplier for 
\... 
production. If this were to happen, Simpson would be paid 
for its research and development. Good suppliers may thus 
' 
be thought of as two tiered operations, research and 
development, and manufacturing. Each tier must be approached 
separately and to mutual advantage 38 • Thus, as automakers 
are i1fcreasingly outsourcing the design and manufacture of 
components, they are sometimes further separating the design 
and manufacturing functions. 
Second tier suppliers 
As outsourcing • gives tier-one more suppliers the 
responsibility in dealing with sub-suppliers, they must now 
take on the administrative work, as well as the engineering 
tasks, that w:~re once done by the automakers. The automakers 
are choosing tier-one suppliers based on their abilities in 
these areas, and are strongly encouraging them to initiate 
. 
the same type of quality and supplier recognition programs 
th~t the Big Three have in place. 
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In 1988 Bendix established a Preferred Supplier Program that 
set its supplier·selection criteria bas·ed on quality, price, 
deliyery and technology. It asks suppliers to use production 
based machines and processes ; to develop prototype 
' 
capabilities whenever possible. Bendix emphasizes the need 
for just-in-time delivery, and awards long term contracts 
to the. sub-suppl .. iers that best meet these objectives. 
Bendix, as well as the big ·three automakers, have come 
across some suppliers that are unwilling or unable to make 
the changes necessary to compete in today's auto industry. 
Bendix has found that they, like the automakers, must 
carefully cultivate suppliers to assure the availability of 
lower tier parts and services 17 • 
. 
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Chpt 4: Reasons for the Changing supplier ~elationship 
Corporate focus on short term earnings 
The heavy involvement of suppliers seems very attractive to 
automakers when viewed in the short term. However, over a 
longer period of time this relationsnip becomes more 
destructive than beneficial. 
Corpora~e performance in the United States today is judged 
on the most recent quarterly earnings report, without regard 
for long term capability and stability. Facility 
modernization, improving production processes, and product 
design seem counterproductive when measured in terms of 
quarterly profits. This problem I lS not unique to the 
automobile industry. The semiconductor, consumer electronic, 
and steel industries have suffered significantly under this 
type of thinking 39 • 
American managers are preoccupied with restructuring 
operations and,.~_selling businesses that do not contribute 
immediately or directly to profit. This can destroy the 
capability of a corporation to develop new products and to 
generate prof its in the future 39 • It will, however, usually 
j 
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help quarterly profits. 
When a company takes this approach. to cutti.ng 
costs, it is forced to look elsewhere to 
technologies and innovations. 
opera7ing 
_/ 
find new 
Some supplier driven research and design projects are 
heal thy, an example being . General Motor's search for a 
supplier for the plastic body panels for the APV minivan. 
~ 
The polyurea developed by Dow Chemical was the result of 
Dow's competing for business with other chemical companies. 
It is also an example of a business that General Motors 
probably does not want to be in - it does not make sense for 
General Motors to try to duplicate the research capabilities 
of a company such as Dow. 
Suppliers innovate for new business 
,. 
Sometimes, suppliers develop products on their own in order 
to generate business. In 1960, when Ford was starting to 
bring Budd's stamping work back in-house, Budd was 
manufacturing the body panels for the Ford Falcon economy 
car. At the time, it was known that Ford was looking to 
/ 
manufacture.· a small, affo+dable sporty car. 
Budd knew that if a sporty derivative could be spun off the 
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-·Falcon it would probably mean more business for them, as 
.. 
Ford was unlikely to bring back in-house a·· chassis Budd was 
already tooled up for. So Budd designed and built their own 
concept of a sporty car using the Falcon chassis. 
~-- / 
Ford took Budd's design, worked with it in ''concept car" 
form at auto shows, and eventually came out with the Ford 
Mustang. 
The Mustang became an instant hit, generating 418,000 sales 
in 1965, a record for any new model introduced up to that 
time. Lee Iacocca took full credit for the Mustang, but the 
original concept was developed by Budd - a supplier hungry 
for new business. It is important to recognize that this 
innovation on the part of Budd was the result of its trying 
to compete with another manufacturer. It just so happens 
that in this case the other manufacturer was Ford itself, 
and not another outside supplier. Had Ford not been in the 
process of taking Budd's work back in-house, Budd would 
probably not have taken the risk of spending development 
money on something as high risk as a totally new car 39 • 
Even though the Mustang was developed in part by Budd, it 
was still very much a Ford. Ford refined the design, did 
much of the engineering, and controlled the 'feel' of the 
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car; brakes, steering, etc. 
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outsourcing whole platform designs 
There is a difference between these types of supplier-
automaker relationships of the past and the more basic 
design work being outsourced today. A good example is the 
Ford Escort. The Escort of the past was introduced by Ford 
a decade ago. The Escort became one of the world's best 
selling cars. At the time Ford was advertising the Escort 
as the "world car''; designed, engineered, and sourced all 
over the world. This was an excellent example of using the 
best suppliers, wherever they might be, and assembling the 
finished product near the regional market where local 
engineers were sensitive to those particular customers, and 
who were able to modify the product accordingly. 
In 1991, Ford introduced a totally redesigned Escort to 
replace the aging original. However, in this case Ford took 
a very different approach to design and outsourcing. For the 
1991 Escort, Ford hired Mazda for the design and production 
engineering. The 'world' car had become a car totally 
engineered in Japan. 
Ford claims that it never made any money on the old style 
Escort, and for many years sold the car at a slight loss to 
keep prices in line with the competition. Ford also kept 
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prices low because it needed to generate sales of Escorts· 
in order to keep its CAFE (corporate.average fuel economy) 
average low. Rather then address the issue of how to make 
money manufacturing an inexpensive car, Ford chose to simply 
buy someone else's car and put their name on it. This 
illustrates the quarterly profits mind set, as opposed to 
long range planning. 
The Ford Probe is another example of an automaker giving up 
control of its own product design. The Probe was sculpted 
in clay in Detroit and sent to Jiiroshima, where Mazda 
designed the body and drive train around its existing MX6 
car. Mazda also did all the production engineering for the 
Probe, which is assembled at Mazda's Flat Rock, Michigan 
plant 40 • 
/ 
( 
The story of the Probe has been repeated at Chrysler and 
General Motors. The Big Three automakers cannot remain 
world-class car manufacturers if they contract out the 
design and engineering of their own products. Just as 
.. 
General Motors must not let itself rely on Bendix for 
crucial technologies, neither can Ford rely on Mazda for 
innovative styling. If the automakers.continue the trends 
of outsourcing parts and designs, they run the risk of 
evolving into little more then sales and marketing 
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enterprises. 
Joint ventures formed to access transplant markets 
For good or bad, there ' 1S little doubt that ·American 
automakers are relying more and more heavily on their parts 
suppliers for new technology. As the automakers shrink their 
in-house research and development groups, and fail to 
develop in-house experts on new technologies, suppliers will 
become the driving force for innovation and new 
technologies. Therefore, it is quite clear that the health 
of America's automakers is directly related to the health 
of their suppliers. 
However, the health ' American suppliers·,, is 
I . • 
being of 
threatened by Japanese transplants. By investing in American 
factories, the Japanese have woven themselves into the 
' . - --- .. -
fabric of the American industry - so much so that the Big 
Three are partners with the Japanese in four of the nine 
transplant 
operations 41 • 
With transplants now producing cars in the United States 
even more cheapiy than in Japan, given the strong yen, the 
Japanese are poised to grab an even bigger share of the 
United States market. The Toyota Motor Corporation, the 
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biggest Japanese car maker, recently announced that its goal 
is to increase American sales of cars and trucks to 1.5 
million by the mid-1990's, up from about 950,000 now. And 
about half those vehicles will be assembled here 42 • 
Thus the Japanese car companies have become important 
employers of American workers. State and local governments 
J;, 
court the transplants as sources of additional jobs, 
offering generous incentives if new plants are located in 
their communities. At the same time, the Japanese have 
cultivated a very strong lobbyirig effort in Washington to 
counter anti-Japanese and protectionism sentiment. 
Many people are concerned with the trend of more 
manufacturing jobs moving from American to Japanese owned 
companies. This trend· of Americans working for foreign 
headquartered - . '\) companies, instead United States 
headquartered, is not necessarily. bad for the country. 
Robert Reich has proposed that it is the American workforce, 
the American people, and not particularly the American 
corporation, that determines the competitive performance of 
the United States economy. He has proposed that the growth 
of transplants is a healthy trend, that the foreign owned 
businesses that fully commit their ''engines of 
competitiveness" to the U.S. will most benefit our national 
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competitiveness 43 • 
This Japanese transplant trend is definitely bad, however, 
for United States based component suppliers to the domestic 
automotive industry. During the last 10 years, the shift 
toward imports and Japanese transplant automobiles has had 
a devastating impact on United States parts suppliers. Few 
suppliers have been able to offset the business that has 
been lost at General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler with sales 
to the transplants. 
The United States automotive parts industry faces a crisis 
in the coming years, unless Japanese transplant companies 
increase parts sourcing from American owned suppliers. In 
1989 General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler produced 5. 7 million 
automobiles in the United States, compared with 7.4 million 
cars in 1986 and 9.0 million cars in 1978. Auto output by 
the three American companies was the lowest in 1989 since· 
the 1982 recession, when 4. 9 million cars were assembled 44 • 
As the chart below. shows, the American market share has 
stabilized at around 59% for the first two quarters of 1990 . 
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· Transplants-_.,,. 
15. ., ..... 
~.;,.: 
't. 
Japanese 
18 
Second Quarter 1990 
Passenger Car Market Share By Geographic Base 
First Quarter 1990 
Manufacturers Total Sales Total Market Share 
American 1.487,546 58.80o/o 
Japanese 464,231 18.35o/o 
European 123,612 4.89o/o 
Transplants 384,991 15.22o/o 
Other Imports 69,511 2.75% 
Total 2,529,891 100.00o/o 
Figure 5 - Passenger Car Market Share 
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Much has been written in the automotive journals about more 
( 
business flowing from transplant automakers to domestic 
suppliers, but these claims must be examined closely. ·Much 
of this work is being done through joint ventures, and some 
of these deals are being made by the transplants in order 
to ease political tensions. United States automotive parts 
suppliers are increasingly seeking joint ventures for no 
other reason than to gain access to the growing transplant 
market. 
\. 
The industry has seen many parts suppliers go out of 
business. Others have been acquired by stronger, healthier 
companies, and others have tried to find business outside 
of the auto industry. Most of the successful domestic 
operations selling to the transplants have been joint 
ventures between I American and Japanese • companies or 
, transplant Japanese parts producers. . ) 
In 1984, 18.5% of all supplier companies in business with 
transplant carmakers in the U.S. were involved in joint 
ventures. In 1987, 31% of supplier companies starting an 
operation were joint ventures; in 1988 they accounted for 
44% of new supplier business; and in 1989 46% of new 
transplant business was a result of joint venture 5 • 
74· 
Some business with transplants is political appeasement. The 
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MIT!) 
is very concerned with the public image of Japanese 
transplants, and has taken steps to improve it. They have 
gone far as to publish brochures • urging Japanese as 
companies operating in the U.S. to give money to charity, 
and instructing them how to best publicize it, something 
culturally foreign to the Japanese. Japanese carmakers are 
being urged to be nice to Americans in order to prevent 
anti-Japanese sentiments from rising. 
Components from off-shore 
High-tech suppliers to transplant automakers - those 
providing high value added products from seat assemblies to 
engines and engine parts - tend to be Japanese. A study was 
f 
done by Easton Consultants, Inc. to find out the product 
engineering content of outsourced parts at the Mazda Motors 
plant in Flat Rock,. Michigan, and to see what types of 
components were made by wholly owned American suppliers. It 
was found that the majority of raw materials and low-
technology (hence low value-added) products are purchased 
from suppliers based in the United States, Canada, and 
Europe. High tech (high value added) components are bought 
from Japanese • companies • or companies involved in joint 
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ventures with Japanese firms. Typically, wholly owned 
American companies supplied things like steel, glass, and 
resins. Japanese transplant companies, or Japanese joint 
ventures, supplied things like transmissions, radiators, 
engines, seat assemblies, and instrument panels. This trend 
is similar at all of the Japanese transplants 45 • 
The Japanese argue that the American suppliers, · in- many 
cases, simply are not as good as the, their Japanese 
competition. There are many examples of American suppliers 
that have not attained world class standards, and have lost 
market share or gone out of business. These are suppliers 
that suffered mostly from bad management, who failed to 
recognize the changing needs of their customer, and 
therefore lost the business. However, there are many United 
States -parts manufacturers who have invested • in new 
facilities. They have red~9_ed costs and improved their 
1.1. 
quality. These are'-companies that are totally competitive, 
and yet they are finding that they cannot penetrate the 
Japanese transplants 46 • 
The reason for their failure to get transplant business 
often has nothing to do with quality, costs,· technology or 
-
willingness to invest to accommodate the needs _ of the 
Japanese customer. After many years of sincere effort, some 
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manufacturers are concluding that they are victims of a 
closed system that excludes American suppliers from ever 
having a fai·r chance to get business 47 • 
• 
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The growing use of suppliers is a move away from vertical 
integration. In theory, there would seem to be enormous 
benefits from vertical integration. It is logical to think 
that internal parts manufacturing capability would speed 
vehicle development. The allied component divisions would 
work in tandem with vehicle groups to reduce design lead 
time, with the assurance that the work will be kept secret 
and proprjtetary. Vertical integration ought to give the 
,...._ -.. . 
automotive enterprise access to state-of-the-art technology 
faster than less vertically integrated competitors that must 
rely on suppliers. 
However, automotive managers today generally feel that 
vertical integration is·----- bad. General Motors has used 
vertical integration as an excuse for not paying profit 
sharing. Ford, which relies heavily on suppliers; and is not 
vertically integrated, has been paying large bonuses. It is 
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thought that vertical integration is always more costly than 
purchasing parts from outside suppliers. 
Allied internal component divisions such as Packard Electric 
are at great risk of losing all their business if they do 
not recognize and reverse the trend towards more outsourcing 
and a less vertically integrated parts_ acquisition and 
manufacturing process. j 
' 
As future automobile designs move towards component systems 
and modular construction, the value added in vehicle 
production can be expected to shift from assembly plants to 
components parts production. If, for example, GM buys high 
value-added modular headliners and doors from. non-GM 
suppliers, much potential profit 
I 
1S lost. Modular 
construction is cost effective today only because it has the 
effect of· shifting construction out of ·the final assembly 
plants, which are extremely difficult to schedule and 
control. The concept of moving this type of work to a 
smaller, easier to manage facility is a good one, but to 
send the_ work outside the. corporation is . a big mistak·e. 
Modular assembly is th~ trend of the future, fbr it greatly 
simplifies-the final assembly process, ~e-coupling it from 
the ·build-up of components. But to ·send .it outside will 
. . 
threaten .the profits--and eventually the very existence of 
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the automakers. 
The trend has been that as automobile technology gets more 
complex, the • American automakers increasingly turn to 
outside suppliers to augment their research, development, 
, 
and sourcing. As this trend continues, the management of 
suppliers will have a much greater impact on the automotive 
enterprise than ever before. 
The trend of more 1 outsourcing, combined with more single 
source suppliers, makes the automakers particularly 
vulnerable to their suppliers' problems. A problem with just 
one J~T _supplier can shut down an entire final assembly 
plant. This situation creates a new challenge for the 
manufacturing enterprise. The enterprise mu~t be extremely 
careful of whom it picks for its suppliers, and constantly 
work to help the suppliers continually improve. Dealing with 
suppliers, which was once primarily a purchasing function, 
is evolving to more · of an industrial/manufacturing 
engineering task. 
Companies such as Bendix, which developed the airbag system 
for the Geo Metro, have developed such sophisticated 
research and development capabilities that they have in fact 
created their own barrier to entry for competing suppliers. 
80 
r-• 
' • 
Q 
The automakers have off-loaded much of the design 
responsibilities to large first-tier suppliers like Bendix, 
which puts the automakers at great risk. General Motors must 
be careful that it does not find Bendix in the same 
uncompetitive mind set situation that developed at Briggs. 
And, just as Ford was forced to bring in-house its body 
fabrication when inefficient Briggs was bought by Chrysler, 
General Motors runs the same risk when it has, for example, 
all of its airbag design work being done by a single 
supplier. Besides short term problems, such as that of 
propellent discussed previously, General Motor's management 
must worry about access to Bendix technology in the future. 
If Bendix were to become controlled by unfriendly owners, 
General Motors might very well lose access to leading edge 
, airbag developments, among other things. 
The measuring of corporate performance by the most recent 
' 
quarterly earnings, without regard for long term·capability 
and stability, has been extremely harmful to United States 
manufacturers. Facility modernization, improving production 
processes, and product design have been severely neglected. 
. . 
This problem is not unique to the automobile industry. The 
consumer electronics, semiconductor, and steel industries 
have suffered significantly under this type of thinking. 
This quarterly profits mindset has been the driving force 
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behind the trend of sending work outside. As long as this 
type of thinking continues, so will the practice of 
shrinking internal research and development capabilities, 
and the increased outsourcing of critical design work. If 
unchecked, there is no reason to think that the United 
States automotive industry will end up any differently then, 
say, the United States consumer electronics industry; little 
more then a marketing and distribution enterprise selling 
other nations' products. 
The Japanese automobile· companies are not concerned about 
short-term profits, but about long-term investment. They are 
investing money in facility modernization, • • improving 
production processes and product design. This long-term 
investment is positioning them well for the future, when 
they will be able to increase market share and thus inflict 
severe damage on the United States automotive industry. 
The Japanese transplant trend is going to have a devastating 
impact on American suppliers such as Bendix, and this will 
also impact the American automakers in the long term. As the 
Big Three market share shrinks due to imports, so will the 
market share of their suppliers. Many of these suppliers are 
not financially strong enough· to _continue·· to provide the 
same level of leading edge research and development with 
• 
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continually· shrinking volumes. This is because they will be 
forced to compete with the Japanese suppliers, whose prices 
i 
do not directly reflect their research and development 
v· 
costs. Over time, this will lead to a significant technical 
and cost advantage for Japanese suppliers. • American 
automakers should share the same fears as the semi-conductor 
~ 
and machine tool industries of being denied leading edge 
technology by foreign controlled suppliers. 
This problem will be compounded by the United States 
automotive manufacturers as they change their focus from in-
house research and development to outsourced research and 
development. The automakers must be careful not to lose 
their significant human resources knowledge base. By not 
having in-house experts who are able to manage projects and 
monitor suppliers' progress, they run the risk of losing 
control of projects. 
Mindful of this risk, automakers must manage outsourced 
projects effectiyely. This is being done in large part by 
using outside design service~ that work on-site. By having 
teams of contract designers working in-house, managers feel 
,they are better able to control complex projects,- and help 
to assure the security of proprietary developments. 
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This relationship must be pursued with great caution because 
simply having outside experts in-house will not guarantee 
the development of, and access to, the latest technical 
' 
innovations. The automakers will need to reverse the trend 
of suppliers (either on-site or off-site) developing 
important new technologies. If the Big Three continue this 
trend of relying more and more on suppliers for innovation, 
history will surely repeat itself and they will find 
themselves at the mercy of their suppliers . 
• 
However, contract engineers will become more valuable in the 
future for other reasons. As the number of engineering 
graduates continues to shrink, there will be fewer qualified 
people for the automakers to hire. The engineers that the 
automakers do hire should be developed as technical experts 
in whatever areas that are of importance at that time, with 
retraining occurring constantly. These highly trained. in-
house engineering managers will then become team leaders, 
assembling groups of both in-house and contract engineers, 
or 'rental experts', who will work on particular projects, 
' 
with the team disbanding at the project's completion. These 
contract people will be technical experts in a narrow field, 
but must additionally b·e· ·ab·le · to· function a; part ·Of·. a 
. ,'. ·• 
broader but still focused·gr6up ·in order to be effective 
47,48 
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In order to manage these projects, both in-house and through 
outside vendors, the whole automot·ive organization will 
become more knowledge based. Automotive enterprises of the 
future will be composed of fewer middle managers, with 
primarily specialists who direct and discipline their own 
performance through organized feedback from colleagues, 
customers, and the corporate headquarters and tech centers. 
The enterprise will become much more information and 
knowledge based than it is today. As the automotive 
enterprises become better at sharing information over long 
distances, and further experience the coming shortage of 
#' , . 
Pengineering personnel mentioned previously, they·will start 
to take advantage of engineering and design services on a 
global scale, sub-contracting to vendors in countries such 
as India, China, and Malaysia 47 • 
When properly managed, supplier relationships can be 
seemingly beneficial to both parties, a good example being 
General Motor's APV minivan development program. For the 
APV, suppliers worked with General Motors to develop new 
materials and processes, an·d shared. in the financial risk 
. . 
as well. In. return, General Motors has agreed. to sole source 
from these suppliers for the APV, but. not necessarily for 
future projects·~ Thus both sides have ownership in the 
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. success or failure of the APV, and suppliers are motivated 
to strive for continuous improvement in order to win future 
contracts. 
While this relationship seems to be· a success so far, it is 
too soon to really tell~ The relationship between General 
Motors and the APV suppliers. is the first ever where a 
significant number of suppliers have so large a sta~e in the 
project's success that their very existence depends on it, 
as discussed previously. It is too soon to tell if this 
relationship will be successful long term, but it must be 
closely watched, for it has the potential to repeat yet 
again the previously examined situatiort where Ford was at 
the mercy of Briggs. General Motors may run into the same 
. 
types of problems sourcing the large plastic panels that it 
has neither the capacity or expertise to manufacture itself. 
Even though these supplier contracts are ~enegotiable, 
realistically there simply are no other suppliers that can 
make the capital investments needed to enter such a niche 
market. If the APV fails because of poor market acceptance, 
the real test of.goodness of this relationship may never be 
known, for suppliers will not be the root cause of the 
failure. But, if it is a huge success and sells well for 
years, this car plant may well predict the future of modular 
outsourcing. If the APV suffers from supplier problems, it 
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will be the most persuasive evidence yet that outsourcing 
is not the way to go.-
The trend of modular sourcing has serious implications for 
traditional automotive suppliers, especially allied 
component groups such as Packard Electric, that have in the 
past enj eyed a somewhat captive market. Even if General 
Motors decides ~ do their own modular construction, as 
suggested previously, this still does not mean that they 
will buy I I wiring from Packard Electric. These allied 
suppliers must now sell themselves as second-tier suppliers 
to former competitors. Many of these competitors have been 
chosen by the final assembly plants as modular component 
manufacturers, and have final sourcing decision on lower 
tier component suppliers. Allied component manufacturers 
must now seek this modular business. ~In order to grow, they 
themselves· should consider branching out into new areas . 
.. 
Some will themselves becom~ second tier suppliers and get 
into· businesses ·such as building components such as . whole 
doors and headliners. Moving into the modular component 
'• 
arena is the only way that allied suppliers will be able to 
maintain and increase their prod:uct content levels in future 
vehicles. 
Technologies deemed crucial to an automakers successful 
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future must be planned and developed in-house, or if 
developed outside be very closely and carefully managed. 
They cannot be bought and simply made to work. I American 
automakers must resist the temptation to use brute force and 
a blank check to attack their deficiencies in new technology 
areas. General Motor's buying, and very painful marriage 
with, EDS (Electronic Data Systems) to gain information data 
processing capabilities is a good example of what management 
can expect when it attempts to "buy" a technical advantage. 
The failure of General Motors to integrate EDS into its very 
different corporate culture, detailed in Keller's Rude 
Awakening 14 , is on a larger scale what American automakers 
can expect if they find themselves having to once again buy 
out their suppliers in order to bring costs, or technical 
innovation, under control. 
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Conclusions 
It is apparent that as automobiles have become more complex,
 
the automakers .have been unwilling to invest in the
 
development and production resources needed to support this
 
new complexity. 
The automakers have instead turned to outside suppliers to
 
provide the research and development services, production
 
facilities, and human resources n~cessary to run their
 
enterprises. These suppliers have increasingly been single
 
source suppliers. Single sourcing is attractive because it
 
encourages suppliers to invest heavily in new technologies
, 
with the promise of a captive market. Additionally, single
 
sourcing simplifies scheduling, and eliminates duplicate
 
\ 
research and development efforts. 
Tfiis trend has been easy to justify because, on the surface, 
it appears to facilitate the move towards modular build
 
packages .. This logic is flawed, however, because there is
 
no reason th·~.t modular build packages cannot be designed and
 
) 
constructed in-house. Manufacturing in-house is the best
· 
single-source supplier relationship there can be, if it is 
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managed corre~tly. 
By outsourcing, the automakers are 'giving away' 
opportunities for value-added profit. They are sacrificing 
true control over the technologies of their products. As 
these automakers rely more and more on outside suppliers for 
design work (many times the SAME supplier), their products 
will lack individuality; they will eventually evolve into 
nothing more than commodities. 
One can only conclude that the present outsourcing trends 
and practices are placing the future industrial prosperity, 
independence, and autonomy of the former big three 
automakers in great jeopardy. To counteract this, the 
automakers have no choice but to bring modular assembly work 
back in-house. They must invest in research and development, 
and modern manufacturing facilities. They mus·t develop their 
human resources so ~hat they are no longer dependent on 
outside concerns for the decisions that shape the very core 
of the enterprise. New manufacturing, investment, and human 
" 
resource development strategies must·be pursued vigorously. 
~ 
The modern, · mu·lti-national aut·o.makers · rest on the 
' exploitation of their techndlogies. If they cannot control 
. ' 
'l. 
the· · de.velopment of thes.~ technologies,. ·than they cannot 
' . 
go: ' ~ ,: . ,:. ' 
•• 
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·control their own futures. By allowing outsiders to feed 
them technical innovations,\~~y one automaker is at great 
risk of receiving only second generation developments, with 
the leading technologies to competitors. The 
automakers must pay close attention to the management of 
these technologies. Even if they. do not bring this 
... 
technology development back in-house, they must carefully 
manage it to assure that they maintain their technological 
competitiveness. 
.. . ... . 
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